The Victory Plan for Ending World War II

the allocation, every claimant to our resources would swallow up American resources and America would not be able to implement adequate planning.[1]

One person who clearly understood this problem, and was in a position to do something to rectify the situation was the savvy Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who knew the consequences of continuing such a chaotic course. Patterson sent a memo to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson urgently requesting the creation of a clear-cut directive based on our accepted strategy toward our own armed forces, coordinated with our commitment to all of the countries receiving military aid.[2] It was Patterson and Stimson who convinced Roosevelt to issue a memorandum on July 9, 1941 directing the Secretaries of War and the Navy to prepare a mobilization plan that would be needed to ensure the defeat of our potential enemies. This was the genesis of the Victory Program. The command encompassed the build up of the armed forces, mobilization of our industrial resources to a war time output, and an instruction to the planners to come up with a suggested strategic plan to actually defeat our enemies once America was at war. Roosevelt knew we were unprepared for war in the summer of 1941 but he believed that it was inevitable that America would be at war within a year. Thus, in addition to a plan for mobilization, the President was also calling for actual battle plans. Roosevelt was in the delicate position of knowing what had to be done and determined that it should be accomplished, but knowing that his efforts, if fully known to the public would be extremely unpopular. It was Roosevelt’s July 9, 1941 memorandum which initiated the Victory Program. The Victory Program was the first overt step which was designed, not only to correct the problems of allocation which plagued the Lend Lease Act, but to get us ready for war. It was a top secret project. The last thing the President wanted to do was to disclose to the American public that he was asking the military to draw up plans for war. Roosevelt had often proclaimed he would not send American boys to a foreign war. Of course, the top secret directive for the preparation of the Victory Program gave the lie to this stance.[3]

The directive went through channels, and when it reached George Marshall, he remembered Wedemeyer’s lengthy report on his two year experience at the Kriegs Akademie as well as the follow up meetings with him concerning the recommendations in the report. It was a logical choice and Marshall charged Wedemeyer with the responsibility for writing the report.[4] Wedemeyer had been assigned to the War Plans Division of the War Department in May of 1941, and when the directive for the preparation of the Victory Program was presented he plunged into the project immediately. The preparation and writing of the report consumed every minute of Wedemeyer’s time night and day for the next several months. It was a signal moment in Wedemeyer’s career.[5] Wedemeyer commenced work on the Victory Program on July 9, 1941 and on September 25, by working around the clock, he produced and submitted a 147 page document which broadly sketched the blueprint for our military build up as well as plans to defeat our enemies, Germany as well as Japan. It is fortunate that such a plan was created for, within a few months the United States was actually engaged in the war which was entirely hypothetical up to that time. The importance of the Victory Program in energizing the country and providing a method to build up our armed forces cannot be overestimated. In a note to the President shortly after Pearl Harbor Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson is one who recognized the effort and praised Wedemeyer, stating that without the timely analysis of blitzkrieg provided by Wedemeyer, “…we should be badly off indeed.”[6] There does not seem to be much other contemporary praise for Wedemeyer’s efforts. Forest Pogue does not share Stimson’s enthusiasm for Wedemeyer’s efforts; in Chapter VII of Ordeal and Hope, “Plan for Victory” which covers the period in which the Victory Program was developed, he spends little time discussing the details of how the plan was constructed, the contents of the plan, or the importance of the effort to the war effort. More importantly, he fails to discuss Marshall’s, as well as the President’s enthusiastic endorsement of the plan and the program it envisioned. Indeed, he spends more time praising General Patton for “…his outstanding performance” in pre war maneuvers held in Louisiana and Texas in late August, 1941, for which shortly thereafter Patton, then a Colonel “…was to be promoted to brigadier general”[7]. Throughout his biography of Marshall, Pogue seems reluctant to give much credit to Wedemeyer, continually referring to the War Plans Division as if it were Marshall’s dominion. This minimizing of Wedemeyer’s effort continues to this day.[8] Two recent books on the major planners of World War II barely recognize Wedemeyer, giving all the credit for planning to Eisenhower and Marshall.[9]

The Victory Program was already completed, having been submitted to his superiors on September 25, 1941,[10] when on December 12, 1941 Eisenhower received a summons from General Marshall to report immediately to Washington DC. The purpose was to utilize his planning tactics in the War Plans Division initially for the Pacific theatre.[11] Until Eisenhower’s appointment his focus up to that point in time had been primarily on the Pacific. Shortly after appointment to the War Plans Division he was designated to replace General Gerow, then head of War Plans. Eisenhower’s vision now was to encompass the entire globe. Eisenhower endorsed virtually all of the recommendations of the Victory Program, especially those relating to the recommendations for the need to invade France with a cross-channel invasion in 1943. Eisenhower early on committed his views in a writing dated March 25, 1942, a memorandum to general Marshall outlining his views on the strategic goals of the Allies in World War II. Known as the Marshal Memorandum or alternatively the Eisenhower Doctrine the document set forth his belief with respect to how the war should be waged. With respect to the European conflict Eisenhower’s view mirrored precisely the earlier recommendations of Wedemeyer, particularly the need for an early attack against

[1] An indication of the lack of preparedness of the country was noted by Fortune magazine in August1941 on pages 42-43 when it reported that “…the United States is not merely falling short, it is failing spectacularly, in nine different ways and nine different places.” See also: Pogue. Ordeal and Hope, Chapter VII.

[3] In a sensational development, on December 5, 1941 the entire contents of the Victory Program were disclosed on the front pages of the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Post, under the byline of Chester Manley. Virtually every important feature of the Victory Program was disclosed. The impact of this incredible story was blunted only the events of December 7, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The identity of the person who leaked the story was never established.

[4] Pogue acknowledges the “assignment” to Wedemeyer of writing the Victory Program and cites Wedemeyer Reports! uncritically throughout Ordeal and Hope, but does not lavish any praise on Wedemeyer. Praise is reserved for Marshall, Eisenhower and Roosevelt, with Wedemeyer seemingly a mere scrivener.