have agreed to drop SLEDGEHAMMER when they realized it was contaminating their main plan.  By undermining confidence in the SLEDGEHAMMER, the British  reasoned, ROUNDUP would fall with, and as it turned out they were correct.

The Most Important June 1942 Meeting-Washington

The next joint meeting of the British and American planners was scheduled for June of 1942 in Washington and at this meeting the British came in with their heavy guns, and effectively gutted (ROUNDUP). Prior to the June meeting, between January 1942 and the June 1942 meeting in Washington, there were many telephonic communications between Churchill and Roosevelt dealing with overall war strategy and Churchill doubtless planted many seeds of concern in Roosevelt’s mind relating to (ROUNDUP). During this same period British and American Planners communicated often, sometimes in England, and sometimes in The United States, and the British instructions to their planners from Churchill were uniform: stress problems with the (ROUNDUP), exploit them, suggest other courses of action. The British considered this June 1942 meeting in Washington crucial and they were intent on forcing their will on the Americans.

            Before discussing what happened at this critical meeting at Washington in June of 1942 it is necessary to take a short diversion in order to raise a question. Why were the British, our wartime allay, and presumably interested in the victory over the Axis as much as the Americans, so opposed to building up a large American force in England in preparation for a cross channel invasion into France in June 1943?  The answer is that when we say “British opposition” we mean, in a word Churchill, a single person who almost single-handedly sidetracked a plan that had the complete endorsement of the American military as well as the President of the United States. England was on the ropes in the spring of 1942, and without American aid they could not survive. It was only the strength of American economic and military support that England so desperately needed, that would enable them to survive. America, as the de facto senior partner could have dictated the entire wartime program, and England would have had no choice but to acquiesce. Churchill never felt in any way inferior or bashful about the position of the British, and his point of view was contagious and permeated the British delegation. As Wedemeyer aptly put it, Churchill was the virtuoso who “…led the orchestra, although America furnished practically all the instruments and most of the musicians.”

Churchill had a delicate job ahead of him.  While simultaneously pressing his own brand of strategy he had to keep the Americans focused on Europe and away from the Pacific. He knew that in America there was a considerable amount of support for the proposition to aid the struggling American forces in the Pacific because of the sneak attack by the Japanese. Americans, stung by the Japanese attack and with the “Remember Pearl Harbor” cry ringing in their ears were anxious for revenge in the Pacific. As Paul Fussell noted, there was no “Remember Poland” outcry.[1]   Churchill had to walk a virtual tightrope.  He did have a ace in the hole. Churchill knew that the impatient Americans wanted to get American troops into action as soon as possible. From Pearl Harbor to a June 1943 invasion was about eighteen months, and he knew that an earlier engagement of American troops almost anywhere would be welcome.  Churchill capitalized on this by encouraging action, so long as it was not a cross channel invasion.  Since no one would have supported any major cross channel invasion in 1942, Churchill linked opposition to the minor 1942 expedition with the 1943 program, both of which he condemned as premature, and came up with his own plan was for a Mediterranean campaign in 1942.  It did have some surface appeal.  It would get American troops into action almost a year earlier. However, he recognized this was an argument with a double edge. If he effectively blocked the American proposal for a 1943 invasion, without getting a commitment from the Americans for a substitute campaign, there was the other theatre that the Americans might turn to, the Pacific. The Americans were already heavily engaged there and had taken a licking for the most part, until the middle of 1942 when things began to slowly go in their favor.  It is likely the American public would have welcomed a strong push in that direction. Churchill was very concerned about this prospect, and had to ward off efforts to send arms, ammunition and supplies in large quantities in that direction and thus lessen the amount to go toward fighting the Nazis, as well as fueling his proposed Mediterranean campaign.

A Mediterranean campaign seemed the perfect solution. It would: (a) satisfy the American public and President Roosevelt’s desire to get American boys into action quickly; (b) siphon off the diversion of arms and equipment which would otherwise go the Pacific; and, (c) most importantly, because of the large commitment in the Mediterranean area, provide a perfect future launching pad for further expeditions in that area, i.e. Sicily and Italy. Of course, Sicily and Italy as future targets were not mentioned at this stage. Churchill succeeded in convincing Roosevelt that the major effort should be in Europe to fight Germany but not in France; instead in another direction.

 So, in addition to getting America into action quickly in 1942 Churchill had to convince Roosevelt that the way to defeat Germany was to go through the Mediterranean via, Africa, Sicily, and Italy, one at a time. If the plan was accepted, it amounted to a de facto cancellation of any invasion of France, at least for 1943 and maybe for good. This was a huge task and it is remarkable that Churchill was as successful as he was in winning Roosevelt over to his side, particularly when it ran directly contrary to the commitment the President had previously made to the strategic concepts of the Victory Program, as well as contrary to the recommendations of his senior military advisors.

To understand how he succeeded we must take a look at Churchill’s personality, and examine his facility with language, his power of persuasion, and last and most importantly, his unique power to communicate with as well as meet one on one with the President without the “interfering” presence of military aids. Churchill was dominating and intimidating in person, particularly one on one. He had a brilliant and facile mind, and was renown for his oratory. He loved words, especially his own! Everyone who writes about Churchill mentions his famous speeches, in Parliament, on the radio during the bombing of Britain, and of course his “iron curtain” speech.

Churchill had a compulsion to bring others to accept his point of view, including his own planners, his military men, President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and the American planners. This compulsion was combined with a lust for power and most importantly the craving to command military forces. This compulsion was almost diabolical. In the early years of the war his ability, to bring others to his view was near perfect. True, as time went on, many saw through his tactics, and the Americans in particular in the later stages of the war were more successful in resisting Churchill’s forceful personality and achieving some of their own goals.

To these personality traits, we must add another powerful weapon he had to undermine the American planners, perhaps the most important of all. Churchill had an astonishing personal relationship with President Roosevelt initiated even prior to the war but honed to perfection, after America’s entry into the war. This relationship permitted him to by-pass all the ordinary diplomatic channels and deal directly with the President. When America finally entered the war, Roosevelt, who considered himself equal to Churchill in planning grand strategy, was anxious, for political reasons, to get American troops into battle as soon as possible, and Churchill planned on using this point to his own advantage. 

There was a Congressional election in November 1942 and Roosevelt wanted some military victories to crow about to the American public eager for some good news after the disaster of Pearl Harbor and the numerous set backs in the Pacific. Thus, Churchill, the master politician who was well aware of the American political situation conceived a master plan which with one brilliant stroke would not only divert the planned invasion of France in June of 1943, and perhaps permanently, but would also satisfy Roosevelt’s desire to put American boys into battle even before June of 1943. This master plan was to be unveiled at the next important meeting in Washington in June 1942. If successful, Churchill could thus satisfy Roosevelt’s desire to get Americans into battle against the hated Nazis before June of 1943 by proposing an invasion into Africa in November 1942. Needless to say Churchill planned on presenting  his “Mediterranean Campaign”, i.e. North Africa, then Sicily, then Italy, piecemeal, well aware that the commitment of such large forces would consume huge quantities of men and material, and stall, if not eliminate altogether any cross-channel plans. Thus, Churchill would be able to take full advantage of President Roosevelt’s pre-conditioned attitude to involve the United States into the war at the earliest opportunity, and simultaneously put the Victory Program on the shelf, at least temporarily. This was the master plan which the British planned on presenting in June 1942 in Washington.

All these carefully prepared plans were discussed with the British planners in advance of this most important meeting. How the British plans were unveiled and how remarkably effective they were was described in some detail by Keith Eiler in an interview he had with Wedemeyer long after his retirement.[2] The first step in the elaborate plan was a preliminary “softening up” meeting arranged between Roosevelt and Lord Louis Mountbatten one on one, with no American advisors present which lasted several hours. Mountbatten, the first to arrive in Washington on June 2, 1942, went directly to president Roosevelt.  Closeted alone with the President and Harry Hopkins, (no American military advisors were present) Mountbatten, having previously been instructed personally by Churchill to discourage a Cross-Channel invasion and recommend instead a Mediterranean campaign, stressed the dangers of a too early invasion of France, suggesting instead putting that off into the future, and getting American troops along with the British engaged earlier against the Nazis in North Africa. The political advantage to Roosevelt in the upcoming election was of course mentioned. Mountbatten like his British counterparts rarely ever attacked a point directly. They would not state outright that they were entirely opposed to the invasion. No, instead they would hint at difficulties, exaggerating them, especially the SLEDGEHAMMER plan which they linked with ROUNDUP while simultaneously stressing the opportunities presented by alternate plans, all the while allowing that the American plans were fundamentally sound, but it was too early to conduct the invasion. Their motive was to side track the American plan, and hope that future events would make the invasion either unnecessary or too dangerous. Churchill used Mountbatten at this secret meeting with the

[1] Paul Fussell. Wartime. P. 138.

[2] Keith E. Eiler. “The Man Who Planned the Victory”. American Heritage. October/November 1983. p. 42-43.

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