group who occasionally disagreed with his grandiose strategic vision. Challenging the Prime Minister was a courageous act which  could be a career ending event, and in the case of Wedemeyer, who was not subject to his direct control, a potentially career shifting event. Churchill was intent on eliminating was the cross channel invasion into France in the summer of 1943. Although he was opposed to a cross channel invasion into France at any time[1], and only agreed later to the invasion in June 1944 under severe duress, he knew it was not a good negotiating tactic to disclose his intention to the Americans. Accordingly, he hid his chief motive and attacked the plan indirectly masking his true intentions.[2]

Churchill pressed his strategic vision early and hard, taking full advantage of his direct access to President Roosevelt.  Within weeks after Pearl Harbor Churchill hurried To Washington for the first wartime conference with Roosevelt, the “Arcadia” conference.[3] Roosevelt was not anxious to meet Churchill so early but was persuaded by the Prime Minister to go along with this early meeting. Prior to Pearl Harbor the Prime Minister was persistent but always deferential in his requests for aid. Immediately after Pearl Harbor Churchill’s efforts to control the war and obtain approval of his plans were raised to a new level, and he was no longer shy about pushing his weight around with American planners. If there be any doubt about this, consider a statement he made to  his planners at a British Chief of Staff meeting the day following Pearl Harbor. Someone suggested a cautious approach to the manner in which an issue should be presented to the Americans. He [the Prime Minister] answered: “…with a wicked leer in his eye: ‘Oh that is the way we talked to her while we  were wooing her; now that she is in the harem, we talk to her quite differently.”[4]  The Prime Minister fully intended to push his strategic vision for the Mediterranean theatre, a theme he never abandoned during the entire four years of the conflict.[5] Ultimately, as will be discussed later, American pressure with a shove by Stalin, finally compelled Churchill to agree to the cross-channel invasion but he never gave up without a struggle.  His later claims for support for the cross-channel plan are not convincing. The manner in which Churchill was able to forestall the planned 1943 invasion and almost succeed in eliminating the invasion entirely is a tribute to the powerful personality of the man, if not his character.

Presentation of the Victory Program to the British April 1942

When the Victory Program was completed in September of 1941 it was embraced with enthusiasm by all the American planners, particularly General Marshall. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Roosevelt also gave their approval.  The first time the British were presented with the Victory Program was in April of 1942 when General Marshall along with a small group of American planners including Wedemeyer, as aid de camp to Marshall, traveled to London in secret to meet the British.  Wedemeyer’s job was to assist Marshall in the presentation of the U.S. plans for the cross channel operation. Wedemeyer and Marshall were in for a lesson on British diplomacy honed by centuries of British experience in dealing with European politics. By comparison the Americans were neophytes. The small planning group arrived in London on April 8, 1942 and the meetings commenced immediately. Churchill personally attended numerous of the meetings. The British listened to the American plan, were polite, but non- committal, but subtly raised a number of questions suggesting potential difficulties and obstacles to implementation of the plan. It was clear that the British had done their homework, and invariably, in the presence of the American planners, they spoke with a single voice; there was never any time when the British planners, in any session with the Americans, would disagree with each other. What the Americans were seeing was a highly developed diplomatic skill developed over centuries of successful international intrigue. They never attacked the American plan directly, only around the edges. They were adept in the use of phrases susceptible of more than one meaning. They kept returning, with calm measured tones to the concept of “scatterization” or periphery pecking with a view of wearing the enemy down and weakening him to a point which would permit an unimpeded invasion which would be the appropriate time for an invasion.

 Understandably a cross channel invasion would require an enormous build up of troops, equipment and supplies in England. Churchill of course knew this and was aware that once that commenced the momentum would make it increasingly difficult to move all this apparatus to another sector. Knowing this, Churchill while still encouraging the huge buildup of forces and equipment, wanted to slow down its concentration in England so that it could be utilized elsewhere, i.e. North Africa, which he already had in mind. Churchill knew the strength of the American economy, and England was almost completely dependent on America for the supply of arms, ammunition, planes and other equipment necessary to fight the Nazis. Churchill knew that the Victory Program which envisioned the building of a huge ten million man American Army, “…would absorb most of the weapons and supplies the British would need for the next two years.”[6] These arms and equipment would be necessary for the forces which would have been committed to the American troops stationed in England and it would be difficult to move them a second time. This concern was also concealed from the Americans.

At the first meetings in April 1942 in London the Americans sensed the British opposition. Both Marshall and Wedemeyer left the first meetings with the British planners impressed with the skill of their counterparts, but with an uneasy suspicion that the British were not fully in support of the plan. Their suspicions were to be fully confirmed shortly. The Americans left London and returned to America carrying with them what could best be described as a lukewarm British endorsement of the cross channel 1943 plan, and with deep concern that they had not heard the last of the British on this question.  Surprisingly, however, after their return to America official word was received that the British Cabinet had endorsed the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan on April 14. In his usual dramatic fashion Churchill spoke of “… two nations marching ahead in the noble brotherhood of arms.” This gave the Americans some reassurance, but they still harbored suspicions about the sincerity of the British endorsement.  It was not long before their suspicions were confirmed.

Eisenhower’s Trip to London May 1942

The first real proof of the British reservations  came when General Eisenhower, newly appointed Chief of War Plans,  now Wedemeyer’s boss, traveled to London in late May 1942 for the purpose of implementing the plans.  This was to be the second time the American proposals were formally presented to the British. Wedemeyer was not included in this trip to London.  Accompanying Eisenhower were Generals Arnold, Somervell, and Mark Clark. Eisenhower at the first meeting immediately sensed a real lack of enthusiasm for the American plan. When Eisenhower returned on June 3, he reported his concerns.

It is important to mention here that (ROUNDUP) was a viable plan. Wedemeyer and his team had gone over every feature of plan with meticulous care and every eventuality was taken into account. The British were assured that the level of troop training, the available of equipment, especially landing craft, and all other material would be available for a June 1943 crossing. However, ROUNDUP did include one provision that arguably was weak. The Americans had included in ROUNDUP a plan for a smaller cross channel invasion,  into France called (SLEDGEHAMMER) which would be launched in late 1942. This plan was contingent, stress contingent, as an emergency plan only to be employed, if such an expedition was deemed necessary to stave off a Russian collapse, or in the unlikely event that the Nazis were collapsing.  It was to be a much smaller expedition, and of necessity almost entirely British. It was entirely severable from the main plan for 1943. No American planner believed that SLEDGEHAMMER would ever provide a sufficient lodgment in France to support an attacking force large enough to defeat Germany. SLEDGEMAMMER was easily unpacked from the 1943 plan, and if the British had been intellectually honest with the Americans and put their foot down endorsing the 1943 invasion program 1942 program on condition that (SLEDGEHAMMER) was scrapped, the Americans would have acceded to this demand. But this was not the tactic employed by the British. Instead, they linked the two programs together, discrediting the shortcomings of SLEDGHAMMER and exploiting them totally out of context in an effort to defeat ROUNDUP. It was the military equivalent of the legal principle of falus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Conversely, the Americans probably should

[1] As early as the first major pre-war Anglo-American conference (Argentia August 1941) at Newfoundland, the British were stressing bombings, blockades, and propaganda as the means to weaken and ultimately defeat the Nazis. They believed that even if some penetration was necessary, armed “local resistance groups” would obviate the need for a large scale invasion. Ordeal and Hope. p. 144.

[2] Churchill, in his six volume history of the war, rushed into print, immediately after conclusion of hostilities, denied that he was opposed to a cross-channel invasion; it was only the timing that he questioned.

[3] December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942.

[4] Arthur Bryant. The Turn of the Tide. London: St. James Place 1957. p. 282.

[5] Mark Perry. Partners in Command. p. 31.

[6] Pogue. Ordeal and Hope. p. 266.

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