ASIA COMMAND. This was a cornerstone of the Stilwell mission. WEDEMEYER did not agree with the basic premise that construction of the road would permit transportation of 100,000 tons of supplies to China a month. It was an impractical and costly operation in WEDEMEYER’s opinion, through dense jungle and over high mountain terrain. Slides, washouts, and monsoons necessitated prohibitive amounts of time, labor and material to keep the road in operation, but the construction of the road was Stilwell’s pet project and since he had Marshall’s encouragement as well as the support of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,  as well as Roosevelt and Churchill, Wedemeyer had no choice but to support the effort. For Stilwell it was almost an obsession. He had been driven out of Burma earlier in the war, and he was determined to return and fight it out in the jungles. WEDEMEYER’s disagreement as to the feasibility of the project was just another of the reasons Stilwell despised WEDEMEYER.                    

Wedemeyer had a number of other duties. He played a major role in planning several military operations in Burma, and then coordinating them with British, Chinese and British forces. The main purpose of the planned operations was to drive the Japanese out of northern Burma so as to secure the land route to China. A second planned operation (CULVERIN) involved an attack against Sumatra, followed by operations against Singapore and northward along the coast of Malay and China. Stilwell almost always was the lone voice opposing the operation. He always had a better way. 

In addition to actually planning the operations in the theatre, Wedemeyer had to consult with, coordinate and seek the approval of the planning operations with his superiors, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their planners which necessitated his making several trips outside the theatre on official business for the purpose of presenting the plans for approval.  In December 1943 Wedemeyer and Mountbatten flew to Cairo to attend the world conference, code named (SEXTANT), to represent their theatre and detail their plans. Although they were present for most of the conference meetings, the only decision made there directly affecting the SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND was a short lived promise to dedicate additional forces and shipping to support the planned amphibious operations in Burma. CHIANG KIA-SHEK was present with his wife and they returned to China highly pleased only to later be given the news that the promises were cancelled. After the Cairo conference, the members departed directly for Teheran where Stalin met them. This was the first War conference that Stalin attended, and he made his presence known. At Stalin’s insistence, and to Churchill’s disappointment, definite plans were formulated and agreed upon to insure the OVERLORD operation in the spring of 1944. Consequently the equipment and supplies previously earmarked for Burma would now be sent to England. This was typical of China’s experience in the war, and CHIANG KIA-SHEK was bitterly disappointed. Again in February 1944, a group headed by Wedemeyer flew to London to present the plans for the Sumatra operation (CULVERIN) to the British Chiefs of Staffs. Wedemeyer learned ahead of time that although Churchill favored the operation, the British planners did not, and he was given a polite but cool reception. These operations never took place. [In the “Eased out to Asia” chapter especially pages 258-267 ACW reports several pleasant meeting with PM re: SEAC and its operations, back and forth London/Washington before going back early August 1944 to SEAC headquarters at Celon] In all of these encounters with the Prime Minister he had enjoyed the meetings,  found Churchill cordial and entertaining, and the only time any tension surfaced was on the few occasions when the subject of European strategy came up, at which time the Prime Minister had “…mental and emotional fits…”[1]. Wedemeyer must have wondered if this touchy subject, in addition to reminding him of their diametrically opposed views, also reminded Churchill of his role in dispatching Wedemeyer to Asia.  Churchill liked and respected Wedemeyer and their relationship was excellent so long as the conversation did not bump up against Churchill’s strategic world view.

[1] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 273.