Now, when Churchill endorsed the idea of an American Commander, Wedemeyer conditioned by his prior exposure to British negotiating tactics, wondered whether Churchill’s long opposition to the project itself led him to conclude, that if it was going forward, it might be a failure, and in this case, he did not want it pinned on a British officer.[1] 

Evidence pointing to Wedemeyer’s transfer to Asia being the result of collusion or a means of punishment is not limited to British origins. Historian Leonard Mosley, also points out that Wedemeyer was only one of several of the members of the
War Planning Board who held pre Pearl Harbor isolationist views, as well as opposing aid to England.[2]  As noted, President Roosevelt did not look kindly on political opposition, and he was especially angered by the opposition generated by the isolationists, such as Lindberg, and he put Embick and Wedemeyer in the same group. Roosevelt, so dependent on General Marshall and knowing of his strong support of Wedemeyer would never have done anything to directly punish Wedemeyer, but would have loved to accomplish that mission indirectly. Therefore, a “promotion” and then “banishment” to Asia seemed perfect. If as a result of a suggestion or recommendation by the British, with Roosevelt’s agreement, Wedemeyer’s was sent to Asia and prevented from participating in the European theatre, especially in the final planning stages of the invasion, and the march across Europe to Germany, all as a result of personal pique, that was a tragedy for the Allies and a stain on the reputation of any who participated in the enterprise. Anyone who knew Wedemeyer and appreciated his brilliance and particularly his knowledge of strategy would have welcomed his assistance. If given the opportunity he would have made a substantial contribution to the effort in Europe. Mosley underscores this point:

…Wedemeyer was probably the greatest expert the U.S. Army possessed about the tactics, the thinking, and the personnel of the German officer corps. Nothing would have been more logical than to post him to a battlefield where he could utilize his expertise in fighting Germans.[3]

The European conflict was anything but a cake walk. There were many blunders which resulted in the needless loss of life. A strategist of Wedemeyer’s caliber would surely have contributed substantially to the effort. Great generals are not fungible and it is not pleasant to think that any American or British planner would endanger the lives of their soldiers for such a personal reason, but there must be some reason more convincing than any that has suggested to date why a man who could have made an important contribution was not utilized. Mosley seems unfazed by the issue, and flatly states that Roosevelt had it in for Wedemeyer, for his pre war isolationist views, and for sharing his father-in-law’s views. Mosley says outright that Roosevelt told Marshall that he could assign Wedemeyer anywhere in the world except to a war theatre where there were Nazi’s fighting.[4] This is a remarkable claim, but Mosley does not put it in quotes, and cites no specific source as proof. The back of the book contains what purports to be “Source Notes” but sadly they are as general as the comments in the main text. I have to date found no corroboration for the claim.

So whatever the reasons, Wedemeyer goes to Asia in October 1943 without complaint as a good soldier should. He remained there till the end of the war. It was not in his character to express public disapproval of actions of his superiors and it was not until 1958, seven years after his retirement, when the bombshell publication of Wedemeyer Reports! hit the American and British public that he first gave any public hint of his disappointment, in his Asia appointment or leveled any criticism at military and civilian leadership.[5] This, of course, did not prevent Wedemeyer from thinking about why he had been transferred. As he said in Wedemeye Reports! he wondered: “…how fate had now decreed that I should be pitted against the Japanese instead of the Germans….Having studied German tactics, I hardly expected to fight the war in the Far East.”[6]
            It was not until 1983, some twenty five years later, when Wedemeyer now long out of the Army was asked a direct question as to whether he felt he was “eased out of Washington” at British suggestion. The question was posed by Keith E. Eiller, a close friend, and Wedemeyer’s designated biographer. Wedemeyer, in answer to the question spoke his mind on the subject for the first time, directly and honestly:

There were rumors in Washington to that effect at the time. I discounted them because I could not believe that Mr. Churchill would attempt to influence Allied strategy in such a manner. Since the war, however, much evidence as come to light suggesting he was indeed capable of such maneuvers.[7]

This is about as far as Wedemeyer was prepared to go in condemning Churchill. He never criticized Roosevelt for the assignment.   There is no evidence as yet uncovered that Wedemeyer ever went any further in disparaging the British leader. Numerous others were not nearly as charitable.  On a one to one basis Wedemeyer had an excellent relationship with the Prime Minister. In Wedemeyer Reports! he recounts numerous pleasant encounters with the Prime Minister, many private,  and some on formal occasions or socially, including several after Wedemeyers assignment to Asia when circumstances brought him to London. Never did Wedemeyer relate any unpleasantness, friction, or tension, except that Churchill did evidence “…mental and emotional fits every time we discussed European strategy.”[8]

Wedemeyer’s Tour in Asia as Second in Command to Admiral Mountbatten

Wedemeyer departed for India to join Mountbatten in October 1943. Although Wedemeyer was disappointed in not being assigned to a combat command in Europe or, in the alternative, continuing on as a planner, he was not adverse to serving with Mountbatten. He found him intelligent, cooperative and anxious to do a good job. However, Wedemeyer was with Monuntbatten for such a short time that despite the considerable effort he made to contribute to the success of the enterprise he was unable to see the effects of his endeavors.  Mountbatten was delighted to have Wedemeyer with him, pleased with his efforts, and a year later when Wedemeyer was sent to China, Mountbatten was very upset at loosing him.[9]

There were several things going on in the theatre which needed attention. The first was the deteriorating  situation between General Stilwell and Chiang. Mountbatten used his best efforts to heal the rift but was unsuccessful. Part of the problem was a serious lack of co-ordination among the Americans, the Chinese and the British due to personal animosities and cross purposes. Stilwell did little to alleviate the problem. Then there was the assignment to complete the Burma Road, the central mission of the SOUTH EAST  

[1] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 246.

[2] Mosley. op cit. p. 151.

[3] Mosley. op. cit. p. 362.

[4] Roosevelt would have liked to had Wedemeyer’s head for “leaking” the victory Program, but he knew there was no proof and he was supported by Marshall. Asia seemed a perfect solution.  Mosley. op. cit. p. 362.

[5] Wedemeyer Reports! was an enormous success receiving almost universal high praise in every major literary review and newspaper throughout the country; not surprisingly less so in England, considering the severe criticism of British Planners, their political motivation, and especially Wedemeyers severe critique of Churchill’s overblown self importance as a military expert.

[6] Ibid. p. 272.

[7] Keith E. Eiler. “The Man Who Planned the Victory”. American Heritage. October/November 1983. pp. 35-46.

[8] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 273.

[9] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 272.

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