realized the long term significance of the momentous events which were occurring during his stay in China, but he did not change his suspicions as to the reasons for the move.

Wedemeyer’s suspicion that he was being shunted aside received some confirmation when his long time secretary told him of a conversation she overheard outside his office shortly after the Quebec conference. It seems several British officers waiting to see Wedemeyer were talking about his new assignment and wondering who Wedemeyer’s replacement would be. With evident relief they agreed that whoever it was would be “…much more acceptable”.[1] They welcomed a change. William Stueck, looking at this issue, and citing the same source agrees with the conclusion that Wedemeyer’s suspicions were correct, observing that Wedemeyer’s “…adamance on the matter probably led to his transfer to the Southeast Asia Command later in the year.”[2]

Any search for the cause of Wedemeyer’s sudden and surprising transfer would have to take into account his very close relationship with his father-in-law General Stanley D. Embick, whose dislike of the Prime Minister was long standing, reaching back to the First World War. Ronald Schaffer describes Embick as a “military dissenter” and no fan of Winston Churchill. He quotes Embick as saying: “A close up observation of Churchill during the war and at the Peace Conference left me with no respect whatever for his character.”[3] In the interim between the wars, and prior to America’s entry into World War II both Wedemeyer and Embick were very much opposed to America furnishing substantial aid to Britain, let alone actual participation in the war. They shared the view of a substantial number of Americans who were against involvement and supported the aims of “America First” the influential isolationist organization which had the backing of many of American policy makers. Wedemeyer and Embick, influenced by the study of history were convinced that America had been “propagandized” into the First World War and resisted any efforts to have it happen again.  Also, Wedemeyer was very close to Charles Lindberg the most prominent member of America First the prominent isolationist organization. Wedemeyer’s and Embick’s foreign policy views did not endear them to either the British or President Roosevelt.[4]

An illustration of Embick’s long held pre war anti-British view was his stance at one of the most important British/American planning sessions held on January 27, and March 29, 1941, months before Pearl Harbor. Embick had been appointed to this important committee by General Marshall. The main topic for discussion was top secret plans which were being discussed dealing with a possible Anglo/American war against the Axis. On April 16, General Marshall consulted with the group and solicited their views on what recommendations he should make to the President when he met with him later that day. Marshall asked the group two key questions: should he recommend to the President that America go to war with England, and was it necessary for the President to make this decision immediately? Marshall questioned each member individually. Embick responded that not only was he adamantly opposed to entry into the war, as were several others, he, unlike most of the group, was against giving substantial military or economic aid to England. He did not see their situation as precarious, and believed that even if it was and  “…if the current crisis led to the fall of the Churchill government, so much the better for the British!”[5] On another occasion Marshall had to step in and admonish Embick for calling Churchill a “vainglorious fool who ought to be thrown out of office for not making peace with the Nazis.”[6] There were few secrets that remained in these planning sessions, and Churchill must have been infuriated when he learned of it; he would have associated Wedemeyer with the same attitude as his father in law. Despite his stance on Churchill, Embick never lost the confidence of General Marshall and continued as a valued member of strategy groups throughout the war. He unsuccessfully opposed British plans for the November 1942 landings in North Africa, as did Wedemeyer as well as Marshall.  Embick was always suspicious of British motives believing all  their strategic recommendations were grounded on political motivations. Churchill, doubtless was chagrined by the influence of both Emick and his son in law.

Embick cannot be dismissed as a crank. In addition to being highly regarded by General Marshall for his personal integrity and knowledge of tactics and strategy. Forest Pogue, the distinguished historian and biographer of Marshall frequently cites him with approval.[7] Pogue reports that Embick commonly made his views known through Wedemeyer while he was an important member of the War Planning Board. The similarity of views of the two men was known to Churchill, and like most powerful political figures did not welcome opposition, especially when it was directed against his strongly held belief in his near infallible military stratagems. Again like most political figures, revenge was one weapon they possessed  and handed out with relish when the opportunity presented itself. Churchill had to bide his time with Wedemeyer. The opportunity to settle the score presented itself at the Quebec meeting in August 1943 when Roosevelt decided to send Wedemeyer to Asia. Roosevelt, so close to Churchill, surely consulted him on the appointment since it involved Admiral Mountbatten, and Churchill was delighted to strongly endorse the move.

Wedemeyer, naturally was ignorant of the goings on of the two master strategists Churchill and Roosevelt, but had long harbored suspicions concerning the Prime Minister’s commencing with the first encounter with him and the British Planners in April 1942 at the first London conference. The suspicions only deepened as time passed. Wedemeyer remembered the way the British had in the spring of 1942 initially embraced the American strategy, then, over time, slowly weakened in their support, followed by  a period of questioning the plan, and finally flatly opposing it. This, in Wedemeyer’s opinion, was a deliberately calculated plan and not the way an ally should openly negotiate according to Wedemeyer’s standards. The British methodology in gaining their strategic objectives in such an indirect fashion left him continually on guard. When, at the Quebec conference, for the first time, the Prime Minister agreed that an American should be in charge of OVERLORD, his suspicions as to the reasons deepened. Up to that time Churchill had strongly opposed having an American in charge, favoring Montgomery, and later going only so far as to suggest a joint command. Now, when Churchill endorsed the idea of an American Commander, Wedemeyer conditioned by his prior exposure to British negotiating tactics, wondered whether Churchill’s long opposition to the project

[1] Ibid. p. 249.

[2] William Stueck. The Wedemeyer Mission. Athens GA: the University of Georgia Press 1984. p. 22.

[3] Ronald Schaffer, “General Stanley D. Embick: Military Dissenter” Military Affairs, vol. 37. Oct. 1973. pp. 89-95.

[4] It should be noted that Wedemeyer and Embick were not the only American planners to hold pre-war isolationistic views. Many American policy makers agreed with them. It should be recalled that the 1940 extension of the draft act, was passed in the House of Representatives by a single vote!

[5] Pogue. op. cit. p. 133.

[6] Leonard Mosley, Marshall Hero For Our Time. New York: Hearst books 1982. p. 153.

[7] Pogue, op cit. p. 129-30.

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