When Wedemeyer arrived, he was shocked[1] to hear that Marshall had sent a radiogram to the President withdrawing his recommendation because the proposed appointment had leaked to the Communists who strongly opposed the appointment and the issue was causing him difficulty in his negotiations. Taking Marshall’s advice, the President withdrew the offer.[2] “Hank” Byroade, one of the State Department persons assigned to assist Marshall believes that the deal was nixed by the Russians, who were much closer to the situation than anyone believed at the time.[3] Wedemeyer is of the same view as Byroade quoting the radiogram Acheson read to him from Marshall to President Truman stating that the proposed appointment had “leaked” and the Communists were angry about the appointment believing Wedemeyer was incapable of being impartial toward them.  Wedemeyer was hated by the Communists, and given the political situation in America at the time it is reasonable to conclude that the Communists managed to exercise a “veto”.  There was substantial sympathy for the Communist cause in America, as well as the State Department at the time, and this would have been just another step along the road to appeasement.   Wedemeyer was astonished to learn that the Chinese Communists evidently held veto power over a Presidential appointment.[4]   

Mosley suggests another reason for Marshall’s change of heart. In a series of letters Wedemeyer sent to Marshall he had implied that Marshall was making a mistake in relying on Communist promises, and that Wedemeyer had made sarcastic comments about Marshall’s State Department advisors.[5] The “letters” which were said to be critical of Marshall and question his judgment don’t seem to support the charges in the view of this writer. They imply a meanness of spirit on behalf of General Marshall totally uncharacteristic of the man. Much more likely is Marshall’s military training and belief that individuals must be sacrificed to accomplish the mission, and if the cancellation of  Wedemeyer’s appointment furthered the cause of America’s foreign policy, then it must be done. 

While Wedemeyer was in the United States after his operation October-November 1946 he wrote a report which President Truman read on November 7. It is referred to on p. 386 of Mosley.  It criticized Marshall and the State Department for neglecting the Nationalists and laying the foundation for a Communist takeover. (report Sept 1945 specifically referred to w/r p. 359) Report written after Wedemeyer returned to China. Wedemeyer refers to a “report” or “message” of November 20, 1945  a part ofwhich he includes in the appendix. Was this the same report? When the State Department got hold of it they claimed it had numerous errors.   A cable was sent to Marshall suggesting he have Wedemeyer correct and alter his statements. Wedemeyer says that the General asked Wedemeyer to do this and Wedemeyer declined. Did  this play  any part in Marshall’s withdrawal of support for Wedemeyer?

Mosley says there is no record in Marshall’s files that he ever asked Wedemeyer to alter or suppress anything in the report.[6] Marshall returned to the United States about January 1, 1947 and took the oath of office as Secretary of State January 21, 1947.

The 1947 Marshall Mission was a failure. He was given an impossible task. No one could have arranged any compromise with the Communists, and if Marshall is to be faulted he shares the blame with most American political leaders. Marshall, like most Americans, did not understand Chairman Mao or the Communists. He was flattered by the blandishments of Chou En-lai, Mao’s number two man, and seemed to accept the sweet talk that the Communists desired nothing more than democracy in China, and he, as well as the United States government did not understand Mao’s relationship with Stalin.[7] In February 1948 Marshall told the United States Congress that: “in China we have no concrete evidence that [the Communist Party is supported by Communists from the outside.” [8]

Without in any way attempting to elevate Wedemeyer at Marshall’s expense, we must credit Wedemeyer with a much more clear headed and accurate estimate of the intentions of Mao and the Communist party. Jung Chang in a recent biography of Mao describes a face to face meeting between Wedemeyer and Mao   when he meets him in Chunking with other American and British officials just after the Japanese surrender in 1945.  In the face to face encounter he charges Mao with the murder and mutilation by his troops of John Birch an American officer and then told Mao “ with more than a hint of a threat" that the United States was considering bringing atomic bombs into China, as well as up to a half million American troops .  Wedemeyer never believed for an instant that Mao and the Communists were bent on anything but a total take over of the political system. He also understood why the Communists liked General Stilwell.[9]

[1] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 369.

[2] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 366.

[3] Mosle. p. 376.

[4] Wedemeyer Reports!. p. 366.

[5] Mosley op. cit.. p. 382.

[6] Mosley. p. 386. [try to locate this document-can Mosley’s statements and the “report” be substantiated?]

[7] Jung Chang. Mao the Unknown Story. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2005. p. 294.

[8] Ibid.

[9] When I visited the Stilwell museum (his former headquarters) 300 feet up above the rocky cliffs of the Yangtze River in June 2006 I was fascinated by the large display of pictures, documents, papers and other memorabilia all devoted to Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell who represented the United States in the China Burma theater in China during the Second World War. There were about a hundred of pictures of Stilwell with all the major world leaders during the Second World War who had visited China and in particular Chonking, including General Marshall, Chaing Kai shek  Mao, etc. General Wedermeyer who replaced Stilwell in 1944 and worked with Chang Kai schek till the end of the war was not once mentioned, and there were no pictures of him. The reasons are clear. As Simon Winchester states the reason is that Stillwell hated Chaing Kai schek, and favored Mao, and that is why President  Roosevelt removed him in 1944 and placed  Wedemeyer in his place. Wedemeyer got along well with Chiang. Winchester says that Stillwell’s loathing for Chiang is why the Communists are willing to feature him in the museum. Simon Winchester. River At the Center of the World  New York: Henry Holt and Company 1996. p. 277)