war.[1] In addition, Wedemeyer found the morale of Stilwell’s forces at a low ebb. Stilwell might have been a courageous officer with a fine war record, and he certainly enjoyed the support of the important superior officers to whom he was responsible, but, at least, in his efforts in China in the last few years he had not paid much attention to the personal concerns of his soldiers.[2] Wedemeyer had previously visited all the theatres of war except Russian and his new China assignment was definitely on the lowest level of priority with the powers that controlled these matters.

Wedemeyer dug into his new duties with enthusiasm. One of his first innovations was to hold weekly press conferences. They were usually attended by about 50 reporters, and to de-emphasize his own name, communications were issued as “China Theatre communiqués”[3] Wedemeyer found the morale of the Chinese troops at a low ebb and his theatre was clearly at immediate risk. The Japanese had concentrated about twelve divisions south of Changsha, and if  these troops advanced,  as seemed likely in Wedemeyer’s estimation, his one and only supply terminal at Kunming, as well as the present capital at Chungking were in serious danger. Preventing this catastrophe was uppermost in his mind, given the directive from the Joint Chiefs that maintaining the supply route to China was vital. If the supply route to China was lost there would be no point in maintaining troops in Burma, because their main function was to protect the supply route from an advance by the Japanese from the South.  Therefore, Wedemeyer’s first decision, which had Chiang Kia shek’s blessing was to place the protection of Kunming above the capital Chunking. A “new capital” could be established if necessary, but not a new supply depot. Wedemeyer had no choice but to detach two American divisions in the Burma area from Mountbatten’s operation in order to prevent a Japanese advance against Kunmikng. This placed him in competition with Mountbatten, which caused some friction, but he had no choice.

A problem which Wedemeyer faced which was unique was to attempt to create a good co-operative and mutually advantageous association with Chiang Kai-shek, and his officers and the American and British officers. Stilwell had done little to foster this relationship. There existed a feeling of mutual distrust, and it permeated up through the ranks of the Americans and British right to the top. Ambassador Gauss astounded Wedemeyer when he declared that “We should pull up the plug and let the whole Chinese Government go down the drain”. Stilwell’s Chief of Staff, Major General Thomas Hearn, shared Stilwell’s attitude when he said that the Chinese were “non committal and deceitful”. He also informed Wedemeyer that every Thursday there was a meeting at the Chinese headquarters supposedly to discuss operations. Stilwell rarely attended, sending a subordinate because he considered them a waste of time, a “tea drinking, time consuming farce”[4] Clearly, Hearn, and any other officer that felt this way was an impediment to the command and had to be removed; Wedemeyer lost no time in making appropriate replacements. He immediately instituted a new mandatory program with required attendance at his headquarters of all senior Chinese and American officers. It was slow going for a while, but after a few weeks a noticeably more optimistic, positive attitude was evident. The Generalissimo heard good things about the meetings and started to attend himself. The new “War Room” was fully equipped with easels and maps and accurately disclosed current troop dispositions. There were about 350 Chinese divisions (a Chinese Division was 10,000 men) when Wedemeyer assumed command. The problem was lack of equipment and training. Wedemeyer, knowing he would never be able to obtain sufficient equipment and supplies for all decided to concentrate on a small number of the divisions, about 39, and work with them. Wedemeyer was satisfied that with this number of well trained and equipped divisions he would be able to drive the Japanese from China.[5]

Of all of Wedemeyer’s accomplishments while in China the one I find most impressive is his positive attitude which enabled him to start an effective training program for the Chinese soldiers. His plan included the training and equipping of approximately 39 divisions (almost a half million men) in the rear area with the intention of making a concerted drive to recapture Canton in the fall of 1945. But for the end of the War in August 1945 he would have executed this operation, which if successful would have opened sea communications with China for the first time since hostilities commenced in1937.

It is true that there were certain special problems of command which needed to be ironed out. Each division was commanded by a Chinese general and had American military advisors attached. Procedures were implemented to take into account what would happen when the Chinese Commander did not agree with the advice of the American advisor. It was not a perfect solution, but it was probably the most innovative and positive step that had been instituted since the arrival of the Americans, and did go a long way to establish harmony. Wedemeyer though “Commander” of the Chinese troops had to delicately deal with the touchy problem of “face” when dealing with Chinese generals. Even when he gave “Orders in the name of Chiang Kia shek” there were occasional problems. It is to the immense credit of Wedemeyer that he recognized the issue and dealt with it in such a diplomatic fashion. When V-J day arrived Wedemeyer’s Chinese troops were poised to execute their plan to recapture Canton. It was about this time that Wedemeyer received his fourth star, and now that the war in Europe was over American was preparing to send substantial American troops as well as senior commanders to the Area. Famed General George S. Patton  as well as several other outstanding high ranking officers were given orders by General Marshall to report to the area to work with Wedemeyer. Of course V-J Day intervened and these events never occurred.  Wedemeyer was again, and for the last time denied his one wish to command troops in battle!

Wedemeyer when he first arrived in China, admitted that at first he did not fully understand the dilemma facing the Nationalists,[6] and that, like General Marshall he had been influenced by Stilwell’s negative assessment of both Chiang Ki-shek as well as the military situation.[7] But in his usual fashion he plunged into the task immediately and began to acquaint himself with the issues and, unlike Stilwell, began to see the Chinese position from a new and objective angle. Even before his China assignment he never accepted Stilwell’s assessment that the Communists were China’s last best hope,[8] and in this regard was undoubtedly influenced by his exposure to the menace of Communism while in Germany.  Then, while a strategist in the War Plans Division he learned a good deal more about the menace of Communism and, to the extent he could without intruding

[1] Wedemeyer Reports!. p. 278.

[2] Wedemeyer Reports!. p. 288.

[3] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 289.

[4] Wedemeyer Reports! p.295.

[5] Wedemeyer Reports! 297-299.

[6] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 282.

[7] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 284.

[8] Wedemeyer Reports! p. 284

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